

Road Map on Experiments in Discrimination (Extremely disorganized and full of personal opinion)

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Terminology and unofficial definitions

① Taste-Based Discrimination (Becker, 1971)

Definition

Let w_g be an offered wage for a representative of the group g . Also, let $P(t|g)$ be a probability of type t given group identity g . For two groups g_1 and g_2 , we say taste-based discrimination exists if $P(t|g_1) = P(t|g_2)$ for all t but $w_{g_1} \neq w_{g_2}$

- preference-based
- internal cost, 'animus' term

② Statistical Discrimination (Arrow, 1974; Phelps, 1972)

Definition

For any groups g_1 and g_2 , and type t , if $P(t|g_1) \neq P(t|g_2)$, we say statistical discrimination exists

- belief-based
- rationalizable(?) discrimination

- Fryer (2007) Statistical discrimination in the dynamic game
- Frankel (2021) Manager's hiring decision as a function of test scores, Principal-Agent model
- Akerlof and Kranton (2000) Group identity, exclusion
- Bohren et al. (2019) Dynamic setting, information acquisition about group identity and past performance. Field experiment data
 - Bohren et al. (2023) Similar model, lab experiment
- Bartoš et al. (2016) Information acquisition and discrimination, attention discrimination, Field experiment data

Resume audit study

- Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) Kline and Walters (2021) Kline et al. (2022): Sending out fake resumes with group-indicative names and record call-back rate
 - deception
 - binary outcome only
 - can't observe beliefs
 - hard to disentangle statistical vs. taste-based discrimination

Resume audit study

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 - deception
 - binary outcome only
 - can't observe beliefs
 - hard do disentangle statistical vs. taste-based discrimination
- Kessler et al. (2019): IRR, avoid deception problems
 - incentive problems
 - still cannot observe beliefs directly

Not resume audit study

- Chan (2023): Using doctor's racial identity and rating available online
- List (2004): Sportscard market, bilateral negotiations
- List (2006): Data from TV show

Lab Experiments

(Very personal) worries

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- Online platform (such as Prolific)
 - A lot of studies are about (gender) discrimination
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- In-person lab
 - Demand effect, or social desirability bias
... especially experimenters sit there and can see subjects directly during sessions

Solutions?

- Do NOT simply compare two (or more) groups
 - For example, you would not see differences in attitude towards male and female groups if the only thing you change is gender indication
- Have better control or dilute sense of “taste-based” discrimination
- Exley and Nielsen (2023)

Lab Experiments: Statistical Discrimination

(Very personal opinion!) Statistical discrimination may be more likely to be observed than taste-based discrimination

- Bohren et al. (2023), Bohren et al. (2019), Bordalo et al. (2016), Bordalo et al. (2019), Coffman et al. (2021)

Still good and very important, but it MAY lead to wrong conclusions about taste-based discrimination, that it does not exist

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Side note about Statistical Discrimination

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Inaccurate beliefs could hurt some groups, and inaccurate beliefs could also be the result of another source of discrimination.

What about using abstract groups?

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 - No reason to have a certain preference for abstract groups!
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- Though it might be hard to generalize to the real-world setting that groups have a specific identity
- Could be useful as a benchmark and see how it will be changed when context is given

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- may capture some taste-based discrimination
 - For example, suppose that both male and female subjects have in-group biases
 - ▶ As a whole, on average, it might look like there is no taste-based discrimination
 - ▶ However, at the group level, their behavior shows taste-based discrimination

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- may capture some taste-based discrimination
 - For example, suppose that both male and female subjects have in-group biases
 - ▶ As a whole, on average, it might look like there is no taste-based discrimination
 - ▶ However, at the group level, their behavior shows taste-based discrimination
- with abstract groups, may reduce the social desirability biases, thus relatively easy to observe taste-based discrimination
 - Chen and Li (2009), Heap and Zizzo (2009)

Lab Experiments: In-group, Out-group Biases

However, in-group and out-group biases are very much context-dependent!

- For example, in Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), both majority-race men and minority-race men have an animus against the minority-race men group.
 - Majority-race men have in-group biases, and minority-race men have out-group biases!
- For abstract groups, in-group biases are often observed

Works that Not Directly Discrimination but Related

How different groups behave differently

- Niederle and Vesterlund (2007): gender differences in competition
- Exley and Kessler (2022): gender differences in describing themselves

These kinds of works could be extended to discrimination work.

For example, whether people take into account these differences when making a decision (Exley and Nielsen, 2023)

Some Useful (auxiliary) Tools

① Item Count Technique

- $n - 1$ dummy statements + statement of interest
- Veiled Treatment: How many of the n statements correspond to you? ($0-n$)
- Direct Treatment: How many of the $n - 1$ statements correspond to you? ($0-n - 1$) AND yes or no for the statement of interest
- Compare Veiled treatment vs. Direct treatment + 1 if yes

② Randomized response

- Three cards
 - ▶ True statement
 - ▶ False statement
 - ▶ Sensitive questions
- Randomly draw one card, ask subjects yes or no

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