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Introductory notes on stochastic rationality*

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1 Stochastic choice and stochastic rationality

In the standard theory of rational choice we start with a set X of alternatives, a family $\mathcal{B}$ of nonempty budgets (subsets of X), and a choice function $c\colon B \mapsto c(B) \subset B$. In one model of **stochastic choice** a single element of B is chosen at random.[1] So instead of a subset of B the "choice" gives us a probability measure on B.

Let $p(x|B)$ denote the probability that x belongs to the choice from B.

Of course we require that $p(x|B) = 0$ for all $x \notin B$ and $\sum_{x \in B} p(x|B) = 1$. When B is itemized, we may simply omit the braces. For example, we may write $p(x|x, y)$ instead of the cumbersome $p\Big(x|\{x, y\}\Big)$.

> To keep things simple, we shall assume that X is finite.

A special kind of stochastic choice is derived from a stochastic preference. Let $\mathcal{P}$ denote the set of linear preference relations on X. (A preference relation $\succ$ is *linear* if it is total, transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric.) The set $\mathcal{P}$ is also finite, having

*These notes expand upon Exercise 1.D.5 in Mas-Colell–Whinston–Green [8, p. 16], and are a simplified (I hope) exposition of some results in McFadden and Richter [10].

[1] There are other models of stochastic choice. We could, for instance, assume that a subset of B is chosen at random. Indeed McFadden and Richter [10] consider an entirely general framework. The case considered here is both natural and simple.

$\# X!$ elements. We may when convenient refer to a preference relation by listing its "skeleton." For instance, if $X = \{x, y, z\}$, we may write $z \succ x \succ y$ to refer to the unique linear preference $\succ$ satisfying $z \succ x \succ y$.

A **stochastic preference** is a probability measure on $\mathcal{P}$.[2] A stochastic preference gives rise to a stochastic choice as follows. Given a linear preference $\succ$ on X and budget B, let

$$\succ\!(B) = \text{ the (unique) } \succ\text{-greatest element of } B.$$

1 Definition *For the purposes of this note, a stochastic choice $(X, \mathcal{B}, p)$ is **stochastically rational** if there is a stochastic preference π on $\mathcal{P}$ such that for all $B \in \mathcal{B}$,*

$$p(x|B) = \pi\Big(\{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : x = \succ\!(B)\}\Big).$$

In this case we say that π rationalizes p.

The next example shows that not every stochastic choice can be rationalized by a stochastic preference. It appears as Exercise 1.D.5 in Mas-Colell–Whinston–Green [8, p. 16].

2 Example Let $X = \{x, y, z\}$, and let $\mathcal{B}$ be the set of all two-element subsets of X. Then the stochastic choice

$$\begin{array}{rr} p(x|x,y) = \frac{1}{2}, & p(y|x,y) = \frac{1}{2} \\ p(y|y,z) = \frac{1}{2}, & p(z|y,z) = \frac{1}{2} \\ p(z|x,z) = \frac{1}{2}, & p(x|x,z) = \frac{1}{2} \end{array} \tag{1.1}$$

is stochastically rational, and is rationalized by π where $\pi(\succ) = 1/6$ for each $\succ \in \mathcal{P}$.

But the stochastic choice

$$\begin{array}{rr} p(x|x,y) = \frac{3}{4}, & p(y|x,y) = \frac{1}{4} \\ p(y|y,z) = \frac{3}{4}, & p(z|y,z) = \frac{1}{4} \\ p(z|x,z) = \frac{3}{4}, & p(x|x,z) = \frac{1}{4} \end{array} \tag{1.2}$$

is not stochastically rational. Perhaps the simplest way to see this is to note that if $z \succ x$, then there are three choices for where y fits in the preference order: $y \succ z \succ x$, $z \succ y \succ x$, or $z \succ x \succ y$. In any event, $y \succ x$ or $z \succ y$ (or both). In other words,

$$\{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : z \succ x\} \subset \{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : z \succ y\} \bigcup \{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : y \succ x\}.$$

[2] A more general, and more complicated, model would allow indifference.

But if p is rationalized by some probability π on $\mathcal{P}$, then (1.2) implies that left-hand side of the inclusion has probability $3/4$, while the union on the right-hand side has probability at most $1/4 + 1/4$, a contradiction.

Both (1.1) and (1.2) are special cases of the following stochastic choice.

$$\begin{aligned} p(x|x,y) &= \alpha, \quad p(y|x,y) = 1-\alpha \\ p(y|y,z) &= \alpha, \quad p(z|y,z) = 1-\alpha \\ p(z|x,z) &= \alpha, \quad p(x|x,z) = 1-\alpha \end{aligned} \tag{1.3}$$

So when is this stochastically rational? The answer is, whenever

$$1/3 \leqslant \alpha \leqslant 2/3.$$

First we show that this condition is necessary. The same argument used above, namely

$$\{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : z \succ x\} \subset \{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : z \succ y\} \bigcup \{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : y \succ x\}$$

shows that a necessary condition is that $\alpha \leqslant 2(1-\alpha)$, or $\alpha \leqslant 2/3$. But

$$\{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : y \succ x\} \subset \{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : y \succ z\} \bigcup \{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : z \succ x\}$$

implies that $1-\alpha \leqslant 2\alpha$, or $1/3 \leqslant \alpha$. To show sufficiency, it is enough to exhibit a π that rationalizes p. So assume $1/3 \leqslant \alpha \leqslant 2/3$, and set

$$\begin{aligned} \pi(x \succ y \succ z) = \pi(y \succ z \succ x) = \pi(z \succ x \succ y) &= \alpha - 1/3 \\ \pi(x \succ z \succ y) = \pi(y \succ x \succ z) = \pi(z \succ y \succ x) &= 2/3 - \alpha. \end{aligned}$$

Simple arithmetic shows that this π rationalizes p. □

2 The Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference

The natural follow-up question is what properties must a random choice p satisfy in order to guarantee that it is rationalized by some random preference π?

We shall prove that stochastically rational choice functions are characterized by the following axiom, which McFadden and Richter [10] dub the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference, but I shall refer to as the McFadden–Richter Axiom, or MRA for short.

3 McFadden–Richter Axiom *A stochastic choice* $(X, \mathcal{B}, p)$ *satisfies the* ***MRA*** *if for every finite sequence* $(x_1, B_1), \dots, (x_n, B_n)$ *(where repetitions are allowed) with each* $B_j \in \mathcal{B}$*, and each* $x_j \in B_j$*,*

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} p(x_j|B_j) \leqslant \max_{\succ \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \mathbf{1}(\succ, x_j, B_j) \tag{2.1}$$

where

$$\mathbf{1}(\succ, x, B) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x \in \succ(B) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The right-hand side of (2.1) cries out for some comment. What it does is find a single preference relation that would choose an element of x_j from B_j for the most j. The remarkable thing is that an upper bound on the sum of the probabilities is given by the number of choices a single preference relation would make.

Here's a simple proof of the necessity of (2.1).

Proof of the necessity of MRA: Assume the stochastic choice p is stochastically rational and that the probability π on $\mathcal{P}$ stochastically rationalizes p. Now fix a finite sequence $(x_1, B_1), \dots, (x_n, B_n)$ with each $B_j \in \mathcal{B}$, and each $x_j \in B_j$. Then

$$p(x_i|B_i) = \sum_{\succ \in \mathcal{P}} \pi(\succ)\, \mathbf{1}(\succ, x_i, B_i)$$

so

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_i p(x_i|B_i) &= \sum_i \sum_{\succ \in \mathcal{P}} \pi(\succ)\, \mathbf{1}(\succ, x_i, B_i) \\ &= \sum_{\succ \in \mathcal{P}} \pi(\succ) \sum_i \mathbf{1}(\succ, x_i, B_i) \\ &\leqslant \underbrace{\sum_{\succ \in \mathcal{P}} \pi(\succ)}_{=1} \left(\max_{\succ \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_i \mathbf{1}(\succ, x_i, B_i) \right) \\ &= \max_{\succ \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_i \mathbf{1}(\succ, x_i, B_i), \end{aligned}$$

which is just (2.1). Thus stochastic rationality implies MRA. ∎

The MRA looks very different from our standard revealed preference axioms, but it is not so alien as it first seems. Let's apply it to the singleton-valued non-stochastic choice case. Let $h\colon \mathcal{B} \to X$ be a singleton-valued choice function. Let us abuse notation slightly and write $x = h(B)$ rather than $\{x\} = h(B)$. Then

$$p(x|B) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = h(B) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

is the corresponding $\{0, 1\}$-valued stochastic choice function. Let S be the strong direct revealed preference relation, defined, as you may recall, by $x \; S \; y$ if for some budget $B \in \mathcal{B}$, we have $y \in B$, $y \neq x$, and $x = h(B)$. Now assume

$$x_1 \; S \; x_2 \; S \; x_3 \cdots S \; x_n,$$

all the x_j distinct,[3] and let B_j be such that $x_j = h(B_j)$ and $x_{j+1} \in B_j$, $j = 1, \dots, n-1$. We now ask, can we have $x_n \; S \; x_1$? If so, let $x_n = h(B_n)$ where $x_1 \in B_n$. Then

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} p(x_j|B_j) = n.$$

Now consider any linear order $\succ$. Transitivity and irreflexivity rule out $x_1 \succ \cdots \succ x_n \succ x_1$, so

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} \mathbf{1}(\succ, x_j, B_j) \leqslant n - 1.$$

Thus $x_n \; S \; x_1$ implies that (2.1) is violated, so MRA implies that

$$x_1 \; S \; x_2 \; S \; x_3 \cdots S \; x_n \implies \neg\, x_n \; S \; x_1,$$

which is just the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference.

4 Example Let's apply the MRA to Example 2.

Consider the sequence

$$\big(\{x\}, \{x, y\}\big), \big(\{y\}, \{y, z\}\big), \big(\{z\}, \{x, z\}\big).$$

For this sequence the left-hand side of (2.1) is

$$\alpha + \alpha + \alpha = 3\alpha$$

[3] The only thing the assumption of distinctness rules out is $x_n = x_1$, since if $x_i = x_j$ for $i < j$, we may simply omit $x_i, \dots, x_{j-1}$. We deal with the possibility $x_n = x_1$ in the next sentence.

Now consider the linear preference $\succ$ given by $x \succ y \succ z$. The corresponding sum for the right-hand side of (2.1) is

$$\mathbf{1}\Big(\succ, \{x\}, \{x, y\}\Big) + \mathbf{1}\Big(\succ, \{y\}, \{y, z\}\Big) + \mathbf{1}\Big(\succ, \{z\}, \{x, z\}\Big) = 1 + 1 + 0 = 2.$$

By symmetry, this is the maximum value for the right-hand sum. Thus in order for (2.1) to hold it is necessary that

$$3\alpha \leqslant 2, \quad \text{or} \quad \alpha \leqslant 2/3.$$

Similarly, for the sequence

$$\Big(\{y\}, \{x, y\}\Big), \Big(\{z\}, \{y, z\}\Big), \Big(\{x\}, \{x, z\}\Big),$$

we see that (2.1) implies

$$3(1 - \alpha) \leqslant 2, \quad \text{or} \quad 1/3 \leqslant \alpha.$$

Now we would like to show that if $1/3 \leqslant \alpha \leqslant 2/3$, then (2.1) holds. I'll postpone further discussion until after the proof. □

3 Characterization of stochastic rationality

5 Theorem (McFadden–Richter [10]) *A stochastic choice p is rationalized by a random preference π on $\mathcal{P}$ if and only it satisfies MRA.*

Proof: (Stochastic rationality $\implies$ MRA): We have already proved this.

(MRA $\implies$ stochastic rationality): We shall prove this part by contraposition. Let us recast the MRA in such a way as to make any repetitions explicit: Let $\mathcal{I}$ be the set of all distinct pairs (x, B) with $B \in \mathcal{B}$ and $x \in B$, and let $\{(x_i, B_i) : i = 1, \dots, N\}$ be an enumeration $\mathcal{I}$. The MRA says that every tuple $(k_i)_{i=1}^N$ of nonnegative integers (k_i may be zero),

$$\sum_{i=1}^N k_i p(x_i|B_i) \leqslant \max_{\succ \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{i=1}^N k_i \mathbf{1}(\succ, x_i, B_i). \tag{2.1$'$}$$

Construct a matrix with rows indexed by $\mathcal{I}$, and columns indexed by $\mathcal{P}$, where the $\big((x, B), \succ\big)$ entry is $\mathbf{1}(\succ, x, B)$. Now append a row of ones. Then p is rationalized by a random preference if and only if the following system of equations has a nonnegative solution $\pi \in \boldsymbol{R}^{\mathcal{P}}$:

$$\begin{array}{cc} & \succ \\ (x,B) & \left[\begin{array}{ccc} & \vdots & \\ \cdots & \mathbf{1}(\succ, x, B) & \cdots \\ & \vdots & \\ \hline \cdots & 1 & \cdots \end{array}\right] \end{array} \begin{bmatrix} \vdots \\ \pi(\succ) \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix} = \left[\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ p(x|B) \\ \vdots \\ \hline 1 \end{array}\right] \tag{3.1}$$

So to prove the contrapositive, we assume that stochastic rationality fails—that is, (3.1) has no solution. By Farkas' Lemma (see, e.g., Gale [4, Theorem 2.6, p. 44]), the alternative is that there exists a vector $y = \big(\cdots, y(x,B), \cdots; y_0\big) \in \boldsymbol{R}^{\mathcal{I}} \times \boldsymbol{R}$ such that

$$\big[\cdots, y(x,B), \cdots; y_0\big] \left[\begin{array}{ccc} & \vdots & \\ \cdots & \mathbf{1}(\succ, x, B) & \cdots \\ & \vdots & \\ \hline \cdots & 1 & \cdots \end{array}\right] \leqq 0, \qquad \big[\cdots, y(x,B), \cdots; y_0\big] \left[\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ p(x|B) \\ \vdots \\ \hline 1 \end{array}\right] > 0$$

or writing it out, for each $\succ \in \mathcal{P}$,

$$\sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}} y(x,B)\mathbf{1}(\succ, x, B) + y_0 \leqslant 0, \tag{3.2}$$

and

$$\sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}} y(x,B)p(x|B) + y_0 > 0. \tag{3.3}$$

Together (3.2) and (3.3) imply that for every $\succ \in \mathcal{P}$,

$$\sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}} y(x,B)\mathbf{1}(\succ, x, B) < \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}} y(x,B)p(x|B) \tag{3.4}$$

Let

$$\mathcal{I}^+ = \{(x,B) \in \mathcal{I} : y(x,B) \geqslant 0\} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{I}^- = \{(x,B) \in \mathcal{I} : y(x,B) < 0\}.$$

Then (3.4) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^+} y(x,B)\mathbf{1}(\succ, x, B) - \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^-} |y(x,B)|\mathbf{1}(\succ, x, B) \\ < \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^+} y(x,B)p(x|B) - \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^-} |y(x,B)|p(x|B). \end{aligned} \tag{3.5}$$

Since this is a finite system of strict inequalities, if there is a solution y, then there is a solution where the coordinates of y are rational numbers. By multiplying by a common denominator, we can find a solution y with integer coordinates. Moreover every coefficient $y(x,B) > 0$ for $(x,B) \in \mathcal{I}^+$ and of course $|y(x,B)| > 0$ for $(x,B) \in \mathcal{I}^-$. Define the nonnegative integers

$$k(x,B) = \begin{cases} y(x,B) & (x,B) \in \mathcal{I}^+ \\ |y(x,B)| & (x,B) \in \mathcal{I}^-. \end{cases}$$

Then we may rewrite (3.5) as

$$\sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^+} k(x,B)\mathbf{1}(\succ,x,B) - \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^-} k(x,B)\mathbf{1}(\succ,x,B) < \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^+} k(x,B)p(x|B) - \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^-} k(x,B)p(x|B). \tag{3.6}$$

Now observe that $\mathbf{1}(\succ,x,B) = 1 - \mathbf{1}(\succ,B\setminus x,B)$ and $p(x|B) = 1 - p(B\setminus x|B)$ (where $p(B\setminus x|B) = \sum_{y\in B\setminus x} p(y|B)$), so (3.6) can be written as

$$\sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^+} k(x,B)\mathbf{1}(\succ,x,B) + \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^-} k(x,B)\mathbf{1}(\succ,B\setminus x,B) < \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^+} k(x,B)p(x|B) + \sum_{(x,B)\in\mathcal{I}^-} k(x,B)p(B\setminus x|B). \tag{3.7}$$

Now consider the finite collection composed as follows. For each or $(x,B) \in \mathcal{I}^+$, take $k(x,B)$ instances of (x,B); and for $(x,B) \in \mathcal{I}^-$ take $k(x,B)$ instances of (y,B) for each $y \in B\setminus x$. Then since (3.7) holds for each $\succ \in \mathcal{P}$, taking the maximum over the left=hand side we have a violation of (2.1'). This proves that if p is not stochastically rational, then MRA is violated.

That is, if p satisfies MRA, then it is stochastically rational. ∎

The proof is a bit disappointing because it does not seem to use at all the intuition from the example. It is possible that the symmetry in the example is atypical, and the reasoning there does not generalize well. I need to think hard about this.

4 Effectivity

The MRA imposes infinitely many restrictions on a stochastic choice even when X is finite, so you might ask whether it is feasible to verify it. In fact, there is a computational procedure for checking stochastic rationality directly in the finite case—the simplex method of linear programming. The system (3.1) of equations is of the form

$$A\pi = p \tag{4.1}$$

where $p \geqq 0$. Consider the following linear program.

$$\text{minimize } \mathbf{1} \cdot z \quad \text{subject to} \quad A\pi + z = p,\ \pi \geqq 0,\ z \geqq 0. \tag{4.2}$$

The system (4.1) has a nonnegative solution $\pi = \bar{\pi}$ if and only if $\pi = \bar{\pi}$, $z = 0$ is a solution of (4.2). In fact, if (4.1) has no solution, then the solution of the dual program will imply (3.2) and (3.3). The program (4.2) is ideally set up to solve with the simplex algorithm since $\pi = 0$, $z = p$ is an obvious initial feasible point.

5 Related literature

Thurstone [11, 12] and Luce [7] do not frame the problem quite the same way we have, but their work paved the way for random utility models. McFadden [9] and Falmagne [3], address the question of stochastic rationality much as we have defined it. Gul and Pessendorfer [5, 6] take the alternatives themselves to be lotteries. There are many other related papers. McFadden [9] has an extensive bibliography and literature survey.

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