

## WARP and the Slutsky matrix

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### 1 Samuelson's Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference

The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference asserts that if you demand  $x$  when  $y$  is in the budget set, it is because you prefer  $x$  to  $y$ . Therefore you should never demand  $y$  when  $x$  is in the budget set. (This of course implicitly assumes a unique utility maximizer, or strict quasiconcavity of the utility.) Paul Samuelson [3, 4, 5, 6] showed that this observation alone is enough to deduce the negative semidefiniteness of the matrix of Slutsky substitution terms.

**1 Definition (Samuelson's Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference)** Let  $X \subset \mathbf{R}^n$  be the consumption set. For an ordinary demand function  $x^*: \mathbf{R}_{++}^n \times \mathbf{R}_{++} \rightarrow X$ , define the binary relation  $S$  on  $X$  by

$$x S y \quad \text{if} \quad (\exists(p, w)) [x = x^*(p, w) \ \& \ y \neq x \ \& \ p \cdot y \leq w].$$

That is,  $x$  is demanded when  $y$  is in the budget set but not demanded, so  $x$  is **revealed preferred** to  $y$ . The demand function  $x^*$  obeys **Samuelson's Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (SWARP)** if  $S$  is an asymmetric relation. That is, if for every  $x, y \in X$ ,

$$x S y \implies \neg y S x.$$

That is, if  $x$  is revealed preferred to  $y$ , then  $y$  is never revealed preferred to  $x$ .

The demand function  $x^*$  satisfies the **budget exhaustion condition** if for all  $(p, w)$ ,

$$p \cdot x^*(p, w) = w.$$

Under the budget exhaustion condition, we can rewrite SWARP in the form that Samuelson used. Let  $x^0$  and  $x^1$  belong to the range of  $x^*$ . That is, let

$$x^0 = x^*(p^0, w^0) = x^*(p^0, p^0 \cdot x^0) \quad \text{and} \quad x^1 = x^*(p^1, w^1) = x^*(p^1, p^1 \cdot x^1).$$

Then  $p^1 \cdot x^0 \leq p^1 \cdot x^1$  and  $x^0 \neq x^1$  imply  $x^1 S x^0$ ; while  $x^0 \neq x^1$  and  $\neg x^0 S x^1$  imply  $p^0 \cdot x^1 > p^0 \cdot x^0$ . Thus, we can write SWARP in Samuelson's form:<sup>1</sup>

$$x^0 \neq x^1 \text{ and } p^1 \cdot x^0 \leq p^1 \cdot x^1 \implies p^0 \cdot x^1 > p^0 \cdot x^0.$$

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<sup>1</sup>It may appear that this condition is weaker than the one stated above, since it applies only to  $x_0$  and  $x_1$  in the range of  $x^*$ , whereas the condition above applies to all  $x$  and  $y$  in  $X$ , which may be larger than the range of  $x^*$ . However, any violation of SWARP as stated above would involve  $x$  and  $y$  with  $x S y$  and  $y S x$ , which can only happen if both  $x$  and  $y$  belong to the range of  $x^*$ . Thus the definitions are equivalent.

## 2 Slutsky compensated demand

This leads us to define the **Slutsky compensated demand**  $s$  in terms of the ordinary demand function  $x^*$  via

$$s(p, \bar{x}) = x^*(p, p \cdot \bar{x})$$

where  $\bar{x} \in X$  can be thought of as an initial endowment that determines the value of income  $w$ . Another interpretation is that if  $\bar{x} = x^*(\bar{p}, \bar{w})$ , then  $s(p, \bar{x})$  is the demand  $x^*(p, w)$  where  $w$  has been adjusted (compensated) so that consumption  $\bar{x}$  is still just affordable at price vector  $p$ .

Note that

$$\frac{\partial s_i(p, \bar{x})}{\partial p_j} = \frac{\partial x_i^*(p, p \cdot \bar{x})}{\partial p_j} + \bar{x}_j \frac{\partial x_i^*(p, p \cdot \bar{x})}{\partial w}.$$

In particular, by setting  $\bar{x} = x^*(p, w)$  we may define the **Slutsky substitution term**

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_{i,j}(p, w) &= \frac{\partial s_i(p, x^*(p, w))}{\partial p_j} \\ &= \frac{\partial x_i^*(p, w)}{\partial p_j} + x_j^*(p, w) \frac{\partial x_i^*(p, w)}{\partial w}. \end{aligned}$$

The following important lemma may be found in Samuelson [6, equation (70), p. 109] or Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [2, Proposition 2.F.1, pp. 30–33].

**2 Lemma** *Let  $x^*$  satisfy the budget exhaustion condition and SWARP. Let*

$$x^0 = x^*(p^0, w^0) \quad \text{and} \quad x^1 = x^*(p^1, p^1 \cdot x^0).$$

*Then*

$$(p^1 - p^0) \cdot (x^1 - x^0) \leq 0,$$

*with equality if and only if  $x^1 = x^0$ .*

*Proof:* If  $x^1 = x^0$ , then the conclusion is true as an equality. So assume  $x^1 \neq x^0$ .

By budget exhaustion

$$p^1 \cdot x^1 = p^1 \cdot x^0. \tag{1}$$

Since  $x^1 \neq x^0$ , this says that  $x^1 \succ x^0$ . So by SWARP, we have  $\neg x^0 \succ x^1$ , that is,

$$p^0 \cdot x^1 > w^0 = p^0 \cdot x^0, \tag{2}$$

where the second equality follows from budget exhaustion. Subtracting inequality (2) from equality (1) gives

$$(p^1 - p^0) \cdot x^1 < (p^1 - p^0) \cdot x^0,$$

which proves the conclusion of the lemma. ■

**3 Theorem** *Let  $x^* : \mathbf{R}_{++}^n \times \mathbf{R}_{++} \rightarrow \mathbf{R}_+^n$  be differentiable and satisfy the budget exhaustion condition and SWARP. Then for every  $(p, w) \in \mathbf{R}_{++}^n \times \mathbf{R}_{++}$ , and every  $v \in \mathbf{R}^n$ ,*

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \sigma_{i,j}(p, w) v_i v_j \leq 0.$$

That is, the matrix of Slutsky substitution terms is negative semidefinite.<sup>2</sup>

*Proof:* Fix  $(p, w) \in \mathbf{R}_{++}^n \times \mathbf{R}_{++}$  and  $v \in \mathbf{R}^n$ . By homogeneity of degree 2 of the quadratic form in  $v$ , without loss of generality we may scale  $v$  so that  $p \pm v \gg 0$ .

Define the function  $x$  on  $[-1, 1]$  via

$$x(t) = s(p + tv, x^*(p, w)). \quad (3)$$

Note that this is differentiable, and  $x(0) = x^*(p, w)$ .

By Lemma 2 (with  $p + tv$  playing the rôle of  $p^1$  and  $p$  playing the rôle of  $p^0$ ),

$$(p + tv - p) \cdot (x(t) - x(0)) = tv \cdot (x(t) - x(0)) \leq 0.$$

For nonzero  $t$ , dividing by  $t^2 > 0$  gives

$$v \cdot \frac{x(t) - x(0)}{t} \leq 0.$$

Taking limits as  $t \rightarrow 0$  gives

$$v \cdot x'(0) \leq 0. \quad (4)$$

By the Chain Rule applied to (3),

$$x'_i(t) = \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{\partial s_i(p + tv, x^*(p, w))}{\partial p_j} v_j. \quad (5)$$

Evaluating (5) at  $t = 0$  yields

$$\begin{aligned} x'_i(0) &= \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{\partial s_i(p, x^*(p, w))}{\partial p_j} v_j \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^n \sigma_{i,j}(p, w) v_j, \end{aligned}$$

where the second equality is just the definition of  $\sigma_{i,j}(p, w)$ . Combining this with (4) gives

$$0 \geq v \cdot x'(0) = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \sigma_{i,j}(p, w) v_i v_j,$$

which completes the proof. ■

This proof is Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell, and Sonnenschein's [1] more modern rewriting of Samuelson's argument.

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<sup>2</sup>Most authors, myself included, usually reserve the term "negative semidefinite" for *symmetric* matrices. In this instance, I won't insist on it.

## References

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