2010 Summer Reading Group

Topic: Matching

Tentative Schedule

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<td>Jul 21</td>
<td>P.J. Healy</td>
<td>Roth and Sotomayor (1992)</td>
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<td>Jul 28</td>
<td>Xiangyu Qu</td>
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<td>Semin Kim</td>
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<td>Aug 11</td>
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Papers by Topic

Surveys


Marriage model with no side payments:


Marriage model with side payments:

• Vande Vate, J., 1989. Linear programming brings marital bliss. Operations Research Letters 8, 147–153


Many-to-one matchings:


Many-to-many matchings:

Strategic considerations:
• Roth, A., 1982. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives 7, 617–628


Experiments:

- Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Unver, U., 2010. Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply, stanford University working paper

Alphabetical List of Papers


