

2010 SUMMER READING GROUP
TOPIC: MATCHING

Tentative Schedule

Date	Presenter	Paper
Jul 21	P.J. Healy	Roth and Sotomayor (1992)
Jul 28	Xiangyu Qu	TBA
Aug 04	Semin Kim	TBA
Aug 11	Chao Yang	TBA
Aug 18	Caleb Cox	TBA
Aug 25	Ross Askanazi	TBA

Papers by Topic

Surveys

- Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M., 1992. Two-sided matching. In: Aumann, R., Hart, S. (Eds.), Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications. Vol. 1. Elsevier, Amsterdam, Ch. 16, pp. 485–541

Marriage model with no side payments:

- Gale, D., Shapley, L., 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly 69 (1), 9–15
- Roth, A., Vande Vate, J., 1990. Random paths to stability in two-sided matching. Econometrica 58 (6), 1475–1480
- Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., 2004. Random matching under dichotomous preferences. Econometrica 72, 257–279
- Echenique, F., 2008. What matchings can be stable ? the testable implications of matching theory 33 (3), 757–768

Marriage model with side payments:

- Shapley, L., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game I: The core. International Journal of Game Theory 1, 111–130
- Mo, J. P., 1988. Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games. Journal of Economic Theory 46, 66–96

- Vande Vate, J., 1989. Linear programming brings marital bliss. *Operations Research Letters* 8, 147–153
- Chambers, C., Echenique, F., 2009. Core matchings of markets with transfers, caltech SS Working Paper 1298

Many-to-one matchings:

- Crawford, V., Kelso, A., 1982. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. *Econometrica* 50, 1483–1504
- Roth, A., 1984b. Stability and polarization of interests in job matching. *Econometrica* 52, 47–57
- Roth, A., 1985. The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. *Journal of Economic Theory* 36, 277–288
- Roth, A., Sotomayor, M., 1989. The college admissions problem revisited. *Econometrica* 57, 559–570
- Crawford, V., 1991. Comparative statics in matching markets. *Journal of Economic Theory* 54, 389–400
- Abdulkadiroglu, A., Sonmez, T., 2003. School choice: A mechanism design approach. *American Economic Review* 93, 729–747
- Echenique, F., Oviedo, J., 2004. Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods. *Journal of Economic Theory* 115 (2), 358–376
- Echenique, F., Yenmez, M. B., 2007. A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues. *Games and Economic Behavior* 59 (1), 46–71

Many-to-many matchings:

- Echenique, F., Oviedo, J., 2006. A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. *Theoretical Economics* 1 (2), 233–273

Strategic considerations:

- Roth, A., 1982. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives 7, 617–628
- Leonard, H., 1983. Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions. *Journal of Political Economy* 91, 461–479
- Roth, A., 1984a. Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem. *Journal of Economic Theory* 34, 383–387
- Roth, A., 1989. Two sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences. *Games and Economic Behavior* 1, 191–209
- Kara, T., Sonmez, T., 1996. Nash implementation of matching rules. *Journal of Economic Theory* 68, 425–439

Experiments:

- Chen, Y., Sonmez, T., 2002. Improving efficiency of on-campus housing: An experimental study. *American Economic Review* 92, 1669–1686
- Chen, Y., Sonmez, T., 2006. School choice: An experimental study. *Journal of Economic Theory* 127, 202–231
- Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., 2008. Making markets thick: Designing rules for offers and acceptances, Stanford University working paper
- Niederle, M., Yariv, L., 2008. Matching through decentralized markets, working paper
- Echenique, F., Wilson, A., Yariv, L., 2009. Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study, caltech SS Working Paper 1315
- Niederle, M., Yariv, L., 2009. Decentralized matching with aligned preferences, nBER Working Paper Number 14840
- Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Unver, U., 2010. Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply, stanford University working paper

Alphabetical List of Papers

- Abdulkadiroglu, A., Sonmez, T., 2003. School choice: A mechanism design approach. *American Economic Review* 93, 729–747.
- Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., 2004. Random matching under dichotomous preferences. *Econometrica* 72, 257–279.
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- Echenique, F., 2008. What matchings can be stable ? the testable implications of matching theory 33 (3), 757–768.
- Echenique, F., Oviedo, J., 2004. Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods. *Journal of Economic Theory* 115 (2), 358–376.

- Echenique, F., Oviedo, J., 2006. A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. *Theoretical Economics* 1 (2), 233–273.
- Echenique, F., Wilson, A., Yariv, L., 2009. Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study, caltech SS Working Paper 1315.
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- Gale, D., Shapley, L., 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. *The American Mathematical Monthly* 69 (1), 9–15.
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- Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Unver, U., 2010. Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply, stanford University working paper.
- Niederle, M., Yariv, L., 2008. Matching through decentralized markets, working paper.
- Niederle, M., Yariv, L., 2009. Decentralized matching with aligned preferences, nBER Working Paper Number 14840.
- Roth, A., 1982. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives 7, 617–628.
- Roth, A., 1984a. Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem. *Journal of Economic Theory* 34, 383–387.
- Roth, A., 1984b. Stability and polarization of interests in job matching. *Econometrica* 52, 47–57.
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