

Tentative Schedule

| Date | Presenter | Paper |
|--------|-------------|--|
| Jul 15 | Mike Sinkey | Bergemann and Valimaki (2002) |
| Jul 22 | Kevin Pflum | Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) |
| Jul 29 | Semin Kim | Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) |
| Aug 05 | Kevin Pflum | Maskin and Moore (1999) |
| Aug 12 | Mike Sinkey | Jackson and Palfrey (1998) (covering briefly Jackson and Palfrey, 2001) |
| Aug 19 | Xiaoshu Xu | Jackson (1991) |
| Aug 26 | Xiangyu Qu | Serrano and Vohra (2005) |
| Sep 02 | Xiangyu Qu | Bergemann and Morris (2009a) (covering briefly Bergemann and Morris, 2009b) |
| Sep 09 | Caleb Cox | Tanaka (2007) |
| Sep 16 | Xiaoshu Xu | Saijo et al. (2007) |

Papers by Topic

Double/Secure Implementation:

- Corchon, L. C., Wilkie, S., 1996. Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism. *Review of Economic Design* 2, 325–337
- Saijo, T., Sjostrom, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. *Theoretical Economics* 2, 203–229

Bayesian Implementation:

- Jackson, M. O., 1991. Bayesian implementation. *Econometrica* 59, 461–477

Robust and Ex-Post Implementation:

- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2005. Robust mechanism design. *Econometrica* 73, 1521–1534
- Jehiel, P., Meyer-ter Vehn, M., Moldovanu, B., Zame, W. R., 2006. The limits of ex post implementation. *Econometrica* 74 (3), 585–610
- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2008. Ex post implementation. *Games and Economic Behavior* 63, 527–566

- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2009d. Robust virtual implementation. *Theoretical Economics* 4, 45–88
- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2009b. Robust implementation in direct mechanisms, forthcoming, *Review of Economic Studies*
- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2009a. Rationalizable implementation, princeton working paper
- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2009c. Robust implementation in general mechanisms, princeton working paper

Information Acquisition

- Bergemann, D., Valimaki, J., 2002. Information acquisition and efficient mechanism design. *Econometrica* 70, 1007–1033

Virtual Nash Implementation:

- Matsushima, H., 1988. A new approach to the implementation problem. *Journal of Economic Theory* 45, 128–144
- Abreu, D., Sen, A., 1991. Virtual implementation in Nash equilibria. *Econometrica* 59, 997–1022
- Abreu, D., Matsushima, H., 1994. Exact implementation. *Journal of Economic Theory* 64, 1–19

Virtual Bayesian Implementation:

- Duggan, J., 1997. Virtual bayesian implementation. *Econometrica* 65, 1175–1199
- Serrano, R., Vohra, R., 2001. Some limitations of virtual bayesian implementation. *Econometrica* 69, 785–792
- Serrano, R., Vohra, R., 2005. A characterization of virtual bayesian implementation. *Games and Economic Behavior* 50, 312–331

Virtual Implementation in Iteratively-Undominated Strategies:

- Abreu, D., Matsushima, H., 1992a. Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies I: Complete information. *Econometrica* 60, 993–1008
- Abreu, D., Matsushima, H., 1992b. Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies II: Incomplete information, princeton University working paper

Robust Virtual Implementation:

- Artemov, G., Kunimoto, T., Serrano, R., 2009. Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the wilson doctrine, brown University working paper

Renegotiation, Side Payments, and Participation:

- Ma, C.-T., Moore, J., Turnbull, S., 1988. Stopping agents from cheating. *Journal of Economic Theory* 46, 355–372
- Jackson, M. O., Palfrey, T. R., 1998. Efficiency and voluntary implementation in markets with repeated pairwise bargaining. *Econometrica* 66, 1353–1388
- Maskin, E., Moore, J., 1999. Implementation and renegotiation. *Review of Economic Studies* 66, 39–56
- Saijo, T., Yamato, T., 1999. A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good. *Journal of Economic Theory* 84, 227–242
- Jackson, M. O., Palfrey, T. R., 2001. Voluntary implementation. *Journal of Economic Theory* 98, 1–25
- Jackson, M. O., Sonnenschein, H., 2007. Overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions. *Econometrica* 75 (1), 241–257

Experiments

- Tanaka, T., 2007. Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation. *The Berkeley Electronic Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Topics* 7 (1), Article 7

Alphabetical List of Papers

- Abreu, D., Matsushima, H., 1992a. Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies I: Complete information. *Econometrica* 60, 993–1008.
- Abreu, D., Matsushima, H., 1992b. Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies II: Incomplete information, princeton University working paper.
- Abreu, D., Matsushima, H., 1994. Exact implementation. *Journal of Economic Theory* 64, 1–19.
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- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2008. Ex post implementation. *Games and Economic Behavior* 63, 527–566.
- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2009a. Rationalizable implementation, princeton working paper.
- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2009b. Robust implementation in direct mechanisms, forthcoming, *Review of Economic Studies*.

- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2009c. Robust implementation in general mechanisms, princeton working paper.
- Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2009d. Robust virtual implementation. *Theoretical Economics* 4, 45–88.
- Bergemann, D., Valimaki, J., 2002. Information acquisition and efficient mechanism design. *Econometrica* 70, 1007–1033.
- Corchon, L. C., Wilkie, S., 1996. Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism. *Review of Economic Design* 2, 325–337.
- Duggan, J., 1997. Virtual bayesian implementation. *Econometrica* 65, 1175–1199.
- Jackson, M. O., 1991. Bayesian implementation. *Econometrica* 59, 461–477.
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- Jehiel, P., Meyer-ter Vehn, M., Moldovanu, B., Zame, W. R., 2006. The limits of ex post implementation. *Econometrica* 74 (3), 585–610.
- Ma, C.-T., Moore, J., Turnbull, S., 1988. Stopping agents from cheating. *Journal of Economic Theory* 46, 355–372.
- Maskin, E., Moore, J., 1999. Implementation and renegotiation. *Review of Economic Studies* 66, 39–56.
- Matsushima, H., 1988. A new approach to the implementation problem. *Journal of Economic Theory* 45, 128–144.
- Saijo, T., Sjostrom, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. *Theoretical Economics* 2, 203–229.
- Saijo, T., Yamato, T., 1999. A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good. *Journal of Economic Theory* 84, 227–242.
- Serrano, R., Vohra, R., 2001. Some limitations of virtual bayesian implementation. *Econometrica* 69, 785–792.
- Serrano, R., Vohra, R., 2005. A characterization of virtual bayesian implementation. *Games and Economic Behavior* 50, 312–331.
- Tanaka, T., 2007. Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation. *The Berkeley Electronic Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Topics* 7 (1), Article 7.