All publications

forthcoming
2010
Gershkov, Alex and Moldovanu, Benny, Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information (2010), in: Games and Economic Behavior, 68:1(144--154)
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Kojima, Fuhito and Manea, Mihai, Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism (2010), in: Journal of Economic Theory, 145:1(106--123)
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2009
Kube, Sebastian and Puppe, Clemens, (When and how) do voters try to manipulate? (2009), in: Public Choice, 139:1(39--52)
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Bose, Subir and Daripa, Arup, A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity (2009), in: Journal of Economic Theory, 144:5(2084--2114)
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Moulin, Hervé, Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects (2009), in: Journal of Economic Theory, 144:1(96--119)
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Crawford, Vincent P., Kugler, Tamar, Neeman, Zvika and Pauzner, Ady, Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations (2009), in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 7:2-3(377-387)
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Baliga, Sandeep and Sjöström, Tomas, Contracting with Third Parties (2009), in: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1:1(75-100)
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Gersbach, Hans, Democratic Mechanisms (2009), in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 7:6(1436--1469)
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Gershkov, Alex and Moldovanu, Benny, Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach (2009), in: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1:2(168-198)
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Börgers, Tilman and Postl, Peter, Efficient compromising (2009), in: Journal of Economic Theory, 144:5(2057--2076)
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Hatfield, John William and Kojima, Fuhito, Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (2009), in: Games and Economic Behavior, 67:2(745--749)
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Triossi, Matteo, Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability (2009), in: Games and Economic Behavior, 66:1(566--575)
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